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One funded account on Sei EVM has one sequential nonce. That is the right model for a wallet and the wrong model for a stream of independent work: a single transaction that never lands freezes every transaction signed after it. The usual fix is a fleet of hot wallets, which multiplies balances, approvals, and keys. sei-nonce-lanes is a reference implementation that removes the queue instead. One funded externally owned account (EOA) keeps its address, balance, and approvals, and keeps many mutually independent operations in flight at the same time. The pattern applies whenever one funded address needs to do many things that do not depend on each other: market making and order flow, liquidation and keeper bots, oracle updates, payout and claim batching, or game and backend transactions.
The repository is a runnable engineering demonstration, not a production service. It uses a mock venue, plaintext development keys in .env, an in-process queue, and console output. Read Before you adapt this before pointing it at real funds.
This page is about submission concurrency. If you want a hosted bundler, a paymaster, and gas sponsorship for consumer wallets, start with Pimlico or Thirdweb EIP-7702 instead. Nonce lanes solve the opposite problem: throughput from one address you control, with no third party in the submission path.

Why one account is one queue

An EVM account’s transaction nonces are strictly sequential. If nonce n has not executed, nonce n + 1 cannot execute first. Two failures that look similar behave differently: The second case is the submission bottleneck. It covers transactions that are dropped, underpriced, rejected at admission, lost before broadcast, or stranded after a process crash. Two properties of Sei make this sharper than on Ethereum:
  • Strict nonce admission. Under Giga, the Autobahn producer mempool admits EVM transactions in per-sender nonce order and rejects a gap with a bad nonce error instead of holding it for later. See Giga mode behavior. The repository’s npm run baseline command probes the behavior of whatever RPC path you configure rather than assuming every endpoint behaves identically.
  • No dependable pending view. Sei does not expose Ethereum-style pending state, and Finality and block tags tells you not to rely on a pending nonce differing from the confirmed nonce. txpool_content is also truncated and collapses the pending/queued distinction. So even where a node answers a pending-nonce query, it is not a foundation to rebuild an in-flight queue on.
Do not design around a pending nonce on Sei. eth_getTransactionCount(address, "pending") is documented as returning EvmNextPendingNonce from the mempool, so it is not an alias for "latest" — but the finality guidance marks the pending view as unreliable, and what you get back varies by node and by whether it runs Giga. The design below sidesteps the question entirely: its hot path reads no nonces at all.
Splitting work across hot wallets raises throughput, but every wallet is another balance to rebalance, another set of approvals to maintain, and another key that can move funds.

How it works

The design combines four ingredients. Each one solves a specific part of the problem, and none is sufficient alone.

ERC-4337 nonce lanes

EntryPoint v0.8 stores a UserOperation nonce as a 192-bit key plus a 64-bit sequence:
The EntryPoint keeps one sequence counter for each key. The specification calls this a two-dimensional nonce; the repository calls a key a lane. Four rules follow from that layout:
  • Operations on different lanes have no ordering relationship.
  • Operations on the same lane stay strictly sequential, so the implementation allows at most one in-flight operation per lane.
  • An operation that executes and reverts still consumes its lane sequence.
  • An operation that never reaches a successful handleOps transaction consumes nothing.
LaneAccount rejects lane 0. Most SDKs pick key 0 when you do not pass one, and work that lands entirely on key 0 is a single queue again. Rejecting it turns a silent fallback into a loud validation failure. ADMIN_LANE (the maximum uint192) is reserved for integrations that need one explicitly ordered lane for administrative calls.

EIP-7702 keeps the funded address

An EIP-7702 authorization writes a delegation designator into the EOA’s code slot:
The address does not change. Its native balance, token balances, protocol state, and approvals stay attached to the same account. When the EntryPoint calls the account, the EVM runs LaneAccount’s code in the EOA’s context, so LaneAccount.execute reaches the target with the funded EOA as msg.sender. LaneAccount inherits the audited Simple7702Account from the account-abstraction repository and adds a single policy check:
The account spends one ordinary EVM nonce to install the delegation, using a type-4 transaction. Sei requires a non-empty authorization list on type-4 transactions; see Transaction types. After that, the submission path signs UserOperations only and the funded account’s EVM nonce stops moving.
EIP-7702 alone does not create independent nonces. It preserves the account. ERC-4337 supplies the independent nonce model. You need both.

Gas-only relayers carry what is left of the queue

UserOperations are not transactions. Something still has to wrap them in EntryPoint.handleOps transactions and pay for them. The repository uses a pool of gas-only relayers fed by an in-process bundling queue. The sequential constraint has not disappeared; it has moved. Each relayer still has one sequential EVM nonce and keeps one outer transaction in flight at a time. What changes is the custody boundary. Relayers hold native SEI for gas and nothing else. A compromised relayer key can lose its own gas balance or rebroadcast operations the funded account already signed. It cannot create a new operation, because every UserOperation carries an EIP-712 signature from the funded account over the EntryPoint’s PackedUserOperation digest. The bundling queue matters for a different reason. It is a plain in-process queue, not a mempool: nothing is gossiped, nothing arrives from a stranger, and it is gone when the process exits. That is what lets it skip the canonical ERC-4337 alt-mempool, which enforces the ERC-7562 validation rules, including SAME_SENDER_MEMPOOL_COUNT = 4 for an unstaked sender. Four pending operations is a wallet number, not a throughput number. Those rules exist so competing bundlers can safely pack strangers’ operations together. Here every operation comes from one account you control, so there are no strangers to defend against. The EntryPoint still enforces everything that protects funds: the signature, per-lane nonce uniqueness, and prefund solvency.

One bundle, start to finish

Each relayer runs one asynchronous worker. The worker takes a bundle of up to MAX_OPS_PER_BUNDLE operations (never two from the same lane), and then works through a fixed sequence. Two details carry most of the safety:
  • Write-ahead ordering. The signed outer transaction is written to the journal before it is broadcast. A crash between signing and sending cannot lose or duplicate work; on restart, the exact raw bytes are rebroadcast first.
  • Same-nonce replacement. If no receipt arrives within BUNDLE_RECEIPT_TIMEOUT_MS, the worker checks earlier attempts for a receipt, bumps fees by REPLACEMENT_FEE_BUMP_PERCENT, and signs a replacement at the same relayer nonce. It never sends nonce n + 1 while a transaction at n might still land, which is exactly the gap this design exists to avoid.
Before any new work is created, a restarted process reconciles every incomplete journal entry against the EntryPoint. If the chain sequence is ahead of the journal, the operation was consumed. If they match, the lane is reserved and the operation is recovered or requeued. If the chain is behind the journal, the state is inconsistent and the process stops rather than guessing.

What fails alone and what fails together

The EntryPoint treats an account execution failure as a per-operation result: it emits a failed UserOperationEvent, charges gas, advances that lane, and continues with the next operation. A validation failure (bad signature, stale sequence, insufficient prefund) is different: it reverts the whole handleOps transaction and nothing in it is consumed. Every bundle is simulated with eth_estimateGas before broadcast, so validation failures are normally caught before any gas is spent. MAX_OPS_PER_BUNDLE sets the size of the shared validation domain; keep it small when isolation matters more than amortized cost.

Why this is hard to replicate

Faster hardware and better RPC routing improve every submission strategy equally. What changes here is structural: it changes what a single funded address is allowed to do, and it does so with the same custody surface as a single wallet. The honest comparison is against a fleet of hot wallets, because that is what most teams actually run. A fleet can match the width. What it cannot match is doing so from one balance, one approval set, and one key.
Read the first two rows together. LANE_POOL_SIZE caps how many operations can be signed and unresolved at once; RELAYER_COUNT caps how many outer transactions are actually broadcast at once. Lanes give you a large pool of independent intents, not a large number of simultaneous transactions. The rough per-block submission width is RELAYER_COUNT × MAX_OPS_PER_BUNDLE.
The pillars behind that table:
  1. One balance, many lanes. Capital, approvals, and protocol state stay on one address. Width comes from lanes, not from splitting funds. A new lane costs nothing to open and is valid at sequence 0 immediately.
  2. A custody boundary you can reason about. The only key that can create a valid operation is the funded account’s. Relayer keys can be rotated, replaced, or lost with a bounded cost measured in gas.
  3. A frozen nonce on the hot path. After the one-time delegation, the funded account’s EVM nonce never moves while submitting. Nothing an RPC drops or a producer rejects can strand the account.
  4. No third-party bundler and no per-sender cap. Keeping the bundling queue in-process removes the ERC-7562 SAME_SENDER_MEMPOOL_COUNT limit and the dependency on someone else’s inclusion policy, while keeping every EntryPoint check that protects funds.
  5. Crash-safe by construction. Signed operations and signed outer transactions are journaled before broadcast. Replacement reuses the relayer nonce. Restart reconciliation is deterministic and refuses to create duplicate work when the state is ambiguous.
  6. Built for how Sei behaves. The hot signing path performs no nonce reads, so an unreliable pending view costs nothing. Fast blocks and instant finality keep each relayer’s receipt wait short, which is what makes RELAYER_COUNT × MAX_OPS_PER_BUNDLE a meaningful per-block width rather than a theoretical one.
Submission concurrency is not execution parallelism. Independent lanes remove ordering between submissions. They do not make conflicting storage writes execute in parallel. A contract that funnels everything through one hot storage slot still serializes on that slot. See Optimizing for parallelization and the parallelization engine.
Block time and gas limits differ between today’s Twin-Turbo consensus and Sei Giga. Size a relayer pool against the network you are actually submitting to, and measure rather than assuming.

Tutorial: run the reference implementation

The walkthrough below deploys the demo contracts, delegates a throwaway account, funds a relayer pool, and submits 24 operations across 32 lanes. One order is deliberately given an unfillable limit price so you can watch a revert land without disturbing its neighbors.

Prerequisites

  • Git with submodule support
  • Foundry with forge, anvil, and cast
  • Node.js 22 or newer, and npm
  • For the Atlantic-2 path: a fresh throwaway key funded from the Sei faucet
1

Clone and verify

Clone with submodules so the pinned account-abstraction and OpenZeppelin dependencies come along:
For an existing clone, run git submodule update --init --recursive.Install the Node dependencies and run every local check:
The Foundry suite runs against the real EntryPoint v0.8 bytecode from the pinned dependency, placed at the canonical address inside the test VM. It proves that different lanes can land in any order, that an execution revert affects only its own lane, that an operation that is never submitted blocks nothing, that a gap on one shared lane reproduces sequential blocking, that one validation failure reverts the whole bundle, that lane 0 is rejected, and that a 50-lane bundle fits in one outer transaction.
2

Choose a target network

Start with a local Prague fork. It carries the deployed EntryPoint bytecode from Atlantic-2 but spends only Anvil funds.
Copy the two printed addresses into .env:
.env
Mutating commands refuse to write to a remote Pacific-1 RPC unless ALLOW_MAINNET=1 is set explicitly. That guard prevents an accidental SEI_CHAIN_ID=1329 run. It does not guard the separate Forge deployment command, and it does not make the demo production-ready.
3

Check the preflight

status is read-only. Run it before anything that writes:
It prints the chain ID, whether code exists at the EntryPoint address 0x4337084D9E255Ff0702461CF8895CE9E3b5Ff108, the account’s current delegation, balances, its EntryPoint deposit, each relayer’s confirmed nonce and gas balance, the lane sequences, and the venue state.
4

Delegate the account

This sends one type-4 transaction with an authorization for LANE_ACCOUNT_IMPL. It spends the account’s EVM nonce once. The command is idempotent: if the account already delegates to the configured implementation, it does nothing. If the account delegates to something else, it tells you before replacing it.
5

Fund the relayers and the EntryPoint deposit

fund uses ordinary transactions to top each relayer up to RELAYER_FUNDING SEI and to bring the account’s EntryPoint.depositTo balance up to ENTRYPOINT_DEPOSIT SEI. The deposit is what the EntryPoint draws prefund from when it validates each operation. On a public network you can instead send SEI to relayer 0 and run npm run dispense, which waits for the balance and splits it across the pool. Use one bootstrapping path or the other, not both.
6

Submit the run

One submit process performs the complete run and exits. It runs the preflight, estimates the delegated call’s gas, reads each lane’s sequence once, signs 24 operations concurrently with no nonce RPCs, journals them, bundles them, drains the bundles through the relayer pool, and prints a report. By default, order 2 receives a limit price below the mark, so its operation reverts during execution while the neighboring lanes continue.

Read the report

The output below is illustrative; your addresses, blocks, and timings will differ.
What to look for:
  • account nonce before and account EVM nonce after must be identical. The funded key never entered a queue.
  • exec is read from the UserOperationEvent in each receipt. reverted means the operation landed, consumed its lane sequence, and failed inside the call. not mined would mean the outer transaction never landed and nothing was consumed.
  • land# is the venue’s global landing counter. It shows the order in which operations actually executed, which has nothing to do with lane number. Lane acquisition is last-in, first-out, so a fresh 32-lane pool starts at lane 32; lane numbers carry no priority.
  • hash check confirms that the locally computed EIP-712 digest matches EntryPoint.getUserOpHash for the first operation, so client-side hashing matches consensus.
If a bundle is reported as PENDING or FAILED, the command exits non-zero and leaves the journal intact. Run npm run submit again once the RPC can answer receipt and nonce queries; the process recovers or replaces at the same relayer nonce before it creates new work. Do not delete the journal and do not send the relayer’s next nonce by hand.

Optional: real swaps on Atlantic-2

The repository includes a real-target path that routes tiny native SEI and native USDC swaps through the documented DragonSwap V1 deployment on Atlantic-2. It is hard-blocked on every other chain. Get testnet USDC from the Circle faucet, then:
swap:setup uses ordinary transactions to approve a limited amount of USDC and to create and seed the WSEI/USDC pair if the factory has no live pair. swap:submit alternates SEI to USDC and USDC to SEI swaps through independent lanes and reports outcomes from EntryPoint events rather than one RPC read per swap. The same knobs apply:
The account must hold enough of both assets for every input-side swap to execute regardless of landing order. Set REVERT_ORDER_INDEX=-1 when you want to measure maximum throughput.

Optional: see the baseline you are escaping

Using a gas-only relayer key so nothing of value is at risk, baseline sends nonce n + 1 while deliberately skipping n, reports whether the RPC path rejected it or stranded it, then fills the gap. Compare that with a submit run where 24 operations from one account are mutually independent.

Tuning

Three knobs shape a run. They interact, so change one at a time and measure.
One lane holds at most one in-flight operation, so LANE_POOL_SIZE is the hard ceiling on unresolved UserOperations in a process. Larger pools permit more concurrently unresolved intents, add startup getNonce reads (batched with bounded concurrency so a public RPC does not rate-limit you), and increase the recovery state you must understand after a failure. ORDERS must not exceed LANE_POOL_SIZE; the application rejects that configuration instead of silently submitting fewer operations.
MAX_OPS_PER_BUNDLE trades amortized outer-transaction overhead for the size of the shared validation failure domain. A width of 1 gives maximum isolation and the highest overhead. Execution reverts stay per-operation at any width. The relayer caps signed transaction gas below the live block gas limit and rejects a bundle whose estimate cannot fit.As a reference point, on Atlantic-2 on September 3, 2026, the real-swap path sustained 77 operations per bundle; 78 hit the 12,500,000 block-gas ceiling and failed safely during simulation. Width 76 produced the best observed submission rate for that call shape, 47.7 landed swaps per second. Treat these as measurements for one call shape on one network at one point in time, not as protocol limits.
Each relayer has one sequential outer transaction stream. Under favorable admission and inclusion conditions, the immediate submission width is roughly RELAYER_COUNT × MAX_OPS_PER_BUNDLE per block. That is a planning heuristic, not a throughput guarantee: RPC latency, block limits, state contention, gas, and producer policy still apply. Public RPC endpoints have rate limits; use a dedicated provider or your own node for anything beyond a demo.

Configuration reference

The application always loads .env from the repository root. The variables you are most likely to change: The repository README documents the full set, including the real-swap variables.

Adapting it to your contract

The demo’s MockPerpVenue is a stand-in that reverts on slippage so a failure is observable. Swapping it for a real target is a matter of encoding a different call. LaneAccount.execute(target, value, data) forwards any call, and the target sees the funded EOA as msg.sender:
The real-swap path in app/src/swap-submit.ts is a complete example of this against a live router, including forwarding native SEI as value. Check these before you trust a new target:
  • msg.sender and tx.origin. At the target, msg.sender is the funded EOA and tx.origin is the gas-paying relayer. Contracts that require tx.origin == msg.sender are incompatible. Audit each router, approval path, callback, reentrancy assumption, and authorization rule.
  • Gas on Sei. Storage writes cost materially more than on Ethereum. The application estimates the delegated call live and raises CALL_GAS_LIMIT when the estimate plus headroom is higher, so do not copy Ethereum-sized static limits. See Gas and fees.
  • Storage contention. Lanes remove submission ordering, not execution conflicts. Analyze which storage slots your calls touch; see Optimizing for parallelization.
  • Lane policy. One lane per in-flight intent is the simplest correct policy. If some calls must stay ordered relative to each other, put them on one lane (or on ADMIN_LANE) rather than falling back to lane 0.

Before you adapt this

The repository is explicit about what it leaves out. Before this design touches real funds, add at least:
  • audited account and integration contracts;
  • hardware-backed or remote signing;
  • a real risk engine with an idempotent intent model;
  • durable, replicated queue and reconciliation storage;
  • metrics, tracing, alerting, and structured logs;
  • controlled deployment and delegation procedures;
  • RPC redundancy and chain-specific fee policy;
  • graceful shutdown and operator runbooks; and
  • load, fault-injection, and live-chain recovery testing.
Delegation is powerful. EIP-7702 changes the code that executes at your address. Before delegating, verify the implementation source and deployed address, verify the target chain, inspect any existing delegation, and use a throwaway account for this demo. submit refuses to run if the current designator does not exactly match LANE_ACCOUNT_IMPL.
Treat .env, app/.state/, signed raw transactions, and RPC URLs containing credentials as sensitive. The journal does not contain private keys, but it contains signed UserOperations and replayable raw transactions until their nonces are consumed. Clone the repository for a teammate and create fresh keys; do not copy a working directory.

Troubleshooting

Check both SEI_CHAIN_ID and SEI_RPC_URL. For a local fork, pass --chain-id 1328 to Anvil. The configured chain ID is part of the EIP-712 signature domain and cannot be guessed safely.
The RPC has no code at 0x4337084D9E255Ff0702461CF8895CE9E3b5Ff108. Confirm the chain and the fork source before deploying anything. The preflight checks for code presence, not byte-for-byte identity; verify canonical addresses independently before a real deployment.
Run npm run status and compare delegated to with LANE_ACCOUNT_IMPL. Do not blindly replace an unexpected designator. Confirm the account, chain, and implementation first, then run npm run delegate deliberately.
Run npm run fund, or send SEI to relayer 0 and run npm run dispense.
Common validation causes: AA24 is an invalid signature or the wrong EIP-712 chain or domain; AA25 is a stale or incorrect lane sequence; an insufficient EntryPoint prefund; or delegation to the wrong account implementation. Run npm run status and resolve the cause before widening bundles or retrying.
The bundle no longer fits the current block gas limit. Nothing in a bundle that fails simulation is broadcast or consumed. Rerun with a smaller MAX_OPS_PER_BUNDLE; the durable queue is repacked at the smaller width.
Only one lane-based process may use an account at a time, even when submit and swap:submit use different journals. Stop the other process. A lock whose recorded PID is no longer alive is removed automatically on the next run.
Do not delete the journal and do not send the relayer’s next nonce manually. Run npm run submit again once the RPC can answer receipt and nonce queries. If the application reports partial lane consumption or a state it cannot reconcile, stop and inspect the EntryPoint events, every attempted transaction hash, the relayer’s confirmed nonce, and each lane sequence.

Resources

sei-nonce-lanes

Source, tests, and the full configuration reference.

EIP-7702: Set EOA account code

The delegation mechanism that keeps the funded address.

ERC-4337: Account abstraction

UserOperations, the EntryPoint, and two-dimensional nonces.

ERC-7562: Validation and mempool rules

The alt-mempool rules the in-process bundling queue sidesteps.

Finality and block tags

Why one confirmation is final and the pending view is unreliable.

Transaction types

Type-4 support and authorization list requirements on Sei.

Pimlico

A hosted ERC-4337 bundler and paymaster, if you want sponsorship instead of throughput.

Thirdweb EIP-7702

EIP-7702 delegation for consumer wallet flows.